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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section
1 x J 2(3)(a) and (5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). This Court has exercised
:r '-so <-oiiiii i.iuliiiiMlii Nnejisous IVhlion lui \\\ I ol t ertiorari, pursuant to Rule 45
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Only one issue was granted for review in this case:
1.
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i ni \ mi ni I.I miml \ m
.l
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amend them take place prior to 12:01
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ase required that any vote to

Januan

>04?

STANDARD FOR REVIEW
I lie issue in this case involves the interpretation of the Restrictive Covenants,
whicli IS;I question nt \\\\\ • \v\ if1 wed Ion oiavtness, t *WJI w Meadows t lame Owners Assoc.
\>. Wasatch City, 40 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001).
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW
I he issue presented above was preserved for review.

The Petitioners,

Swensons, filedaMotiof'1 In Ni'llif\ Nolu v nnVimiiiiilmn ol Rt'stndiu'l owtiants, basal
upon several grounds, including the fact that the Restrictive Covenants were automatically
renewed for another successive ten (10) year period commencing on January 1,2004 at 12:01
i in k'loie (he ;illrt»nl majority vote was taken on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 41-50).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceedings
Prior appeal, Swenson 7. This case involves the enforcement of Restrictive
Covenants filed on property in Salt Lake County, known as the Quail Point Subdivision. The
Plaintiffs, and Petitioners herein, ("S wensons") brought a previous action in 1997 to enforce
the Restrictive Covenants and prevent their neighbor Erickson from building a large
workshop in his backyard, obstructing their view of the mountains. Swenson v. Erickson,
998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). (See copy of case attached, Addendum, Ex. "B"). In the previous
action the trial court found that the large workshop Erickson was building was in violation
of the Restrictive Covenants.
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the trial court and then a
preliminary injunction hearing was held on September 4, 1997, wherein the court granted
Swensons a Preliminary Injunction. The trial court ruled, among other things, that the
Restrictive Covenants strictly prohibited the building of such a structure; and that the
structure was not a private garage, a guest house, or an outbuilding for pets as designated
under Article I of the Restrictive Covenants. (See copy of Restrictive Covenants attached,
Addendum, Ex. "A", pg. 1).
Subsequent to the court's granting of the preliminary injunction, Erickson
caused Robert Campbell, as a newly appointed architectural committee member, to file a
Notice of Termination of the Restrictive Covenants, dated October 3, 1997. This was done
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even though the Restrictive Covenants on January 1, 1994, had been renewed for a
successive ten (10) year period, through December 31, 2003. Erickson then filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint, and to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, alleging that the Notice of Termination terminated the Restrictive
Covenants.
Swensons in turn filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Erickson's Motion to
Dismiss and filed a Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants,
pursuant to Section 38-9-7 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). The Motion to Nullify was based,
among other things, on the fact that the Restrictive Covenants automatically renewed for a
successive ten (10) year period on January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2003, and
therefore could not be terminated by a majority vote during the ten (10) year renewal period.
The trial court granted Erickson's Motion to Dismiss, but failed to address
Swensons' Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants and failed
to rule on whether or not the Restrictive Covenants were still valid.
The Swensons appealed the trial court's decision and on appeal the Utah
Supreme Court ruled that the structure was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants and that
the Restrictive Covenants were not terminated, but were automatically renewed on January
1, 1994 for a period often (10) years. The Utah Supreme Court goes on to state: "the
owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such time as the covenants are
due for extension. The last such time was January 1, 2004; we assume that the next such
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time will be on January 1, 2004. This being so, the petition, assuming it represents a
majority vote of the owners, is still invalid. The owner's attempted termination of the
restrictive covenants is without effect. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, at 815 (Utah
2000). (Addendum, Ex. "B").
The case was remanded back down to district court for the entry of a permanent
injunction, which was entered by the Third District Court on August 31, 2000. Since, the
entry of the Permanent Injunction, Erickson again attempted to terminate the Restrictive
Covenants by a majority vote which was taken on January 1,2004.
The Present Case. The Complaint in this matter was filed on February 6,2004
(Rec. 1 -9). Another Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants was filed on March 26,
2004 (Rec. 33); and a First Amended Complaint was filed on April 27,2004, (Rec. 10-36)
seeking Declaratory Relief as before, on the Notice of Termination. (Rec. 15).
On May 10, 2004, Swensons filed their Motion to Nullify the Notice of
Termination and their Memorandum in Support. (Rec. 41-50). On June 11, 2004, the
Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of
Restrictive Covenants. (Rec. 58-77). Swensons filed their Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants on June 22, 2004.
(Rec. 78-106). On September 20,2004, the court heard oral argument on Swensons' Motion
to Nullify and took the matter under advisement. (Rec. 117).
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On October 25, 2004, the court rendered its decision (Rec. 118-121) finding
that since the Covenants allow for a change "in whole or in part", that this is inclusive of
termination; and thus the Covenants do allow for termination by a majority vote. (Rec. 120)
(See a complete copy of the trial court's Order attached, Addendum, Ex. "D").
The court further ruled that although the vote to terminate was conducted
during the day of January 1,2004, it was still effective. (Rec. 120) The trial court relied on
the Utah Supreme Court's statement in the previous case, wherein the Court states:
"[T]he owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only
at such time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time
was January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time will be
on January 1, 2004." (Rec. 120) (See Add. Ex. "D" pg. 3)
As a result of the trial court's ruling on the Notice of Termination, on
November 17,2004, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal in the case. (Rec. 123). On
November 23, 2004 a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Swensons, appealing the trial
court's ruling and Order of October 25,2004. (Rec. 125).
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion on February 2, 2006, and in
reliance of the same language in Swenson /, affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that
both the renewal and the majority vote to terminate the Covenants could occur on the same
day, January 1, 2004; and since there was no specific time set forth for the renewal of the
Covenants, that the vote, which took place between noon and 2:00 p.m., was effective to
terminate the Covenants. (See Opinion by Utah Court of Appeals, Addendum Ex. E).
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On March 2, 2006, the Swensons filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
which was granted as to the issue of, "whether the Covenants at issue in this case required
that any vote to amend them take place prior to 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004."
Statement of the Facts
1.

The Plaintiffs ("Swensons") are owners of Lot 21 in the Quail Point

Subdivision ("Subdivision"), and reside on the lot in a single family residence, which has
a street address of 9135 Morningview Drive, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12).
2.

The Defendant, David V. Erickson ("Erickson") is the owner of Lot 26 in

the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street
address of 9150 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12).
3.

The Defendant, David R. Limberg ("Limberg") is the owner of Lot 27 in

the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street
address of 9144 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12).
4.

The Subdivision was created on July 9, 1973, by Kirton Land

Development and Investment Corporation. Harold M. Campbell and Mary Campbell, the
owners of a certain tract of land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more fully
described as follows:
Lots 1 through 52, QUAIL POINT SUBDIVISION, a
subdivision of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, according to
the official plat thereof on file and of record in the Office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder.
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plated and subdivided the tract by filing a map and plat of the tract in the Office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah. (Rec. 2).
5.

Pursuant to Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the

Campbell's purpose of creating uniform restrictions upon the use and improvement of the
tract, and for the benefit of all of the lots in the tract, and the owners and the purchasers
of lots in that tract, Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the
Campbells, recorded, on July 9 1973, Quail Point Subdivision Restrictive Covenants
("Restrictive Covenants"), which are recorded in Book 3368 at Page 429 through 432.
(Rec. 2). See Restrictive Covenants contained in the Record (Rec. 17-20) and attached
hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "A".
6.

The Swensons, and Erickson and Limberg, acquired their interest in their

lots with notice and knowledge of the Restrictive Covenants filed on the Subdivision.
(Rec. 3).
7.

In the past, Erickson, commenced building a workshop on his property in

direct violation of the Restrictive Covenants, which did not allow any structure to be
erected on the lots, "other than one detached single-family dwelling, a private garage, a
guest house and out buildings for pets." (Rec. 4 & 12).(Add. Ex. "A", pg. 1).
8.

To enforce the Restrictive Covenants on the property the Swensons filed

suit in the Third District Court, and obtained an injunction against Erickson from building
his workshop. Case No. 970905359CV. (Rec. 13).
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9.

After the injunction was issued, Erickson attempted to terminate the

Restrictive Covenants by filing a Notice of Termination, by a claimed majority, with the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on October 6, 1997. The Third District Court based
on the Notice of Termination, dismissed the action; and Swensons appealed. Appeal No.
980075. (Rec. 13).
10.

On appeal the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the structure Erickson was

building was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants, and further found that the attempt
to terminate the Covenants by a majority of the property owners in October of 1997 was
of no effect, because the Covenants had been automatically extended for 10 years on
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2003. This was a published decision. Swenson v.
Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) ^Swenson F herein). This is in the Record (Rec.
21-30) and is also attached hereto, in the Addendum as Ex. "B".
11.

The case was remanded to the district court for the entry of a permanent

injunction, which was entered by the Third District Court on August 31, 2000. The
Permanent Injunction also provides for costs and attorney's fees incurred to enforce the
Order. (Rec. 13). The Permanent Injunction is located in the Record. (Rec. 31-32).
12.

Since the entry of the Permanent Injunction Order, Erickson and Limberg

have again attempted to terminate the Restrictive Covenants by a majority vote, which
was allegedly taken after 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004, between 12:00 noon and 2:00
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p.m., after the Restrictive Covenants were already automatically renewed for another 10
year period on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 14).
13

On March 26, 2004, another Notice of Termination of Restrictive

Covenants was filed on the property in the Subdivision, claiming that the Restrictive
Covenants were terminated by a majority vote of the owners on January 1,2004. (Rec.
15). A copy of the Notice of Termination is contained in the Record (Rec. 33), and
attached hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "C".
14.

The vote allegedly occurred on January 1, 2004 from 12:00 noon through

2:00 p.m. The vote was not to amend the Covenants, but to terminate the Covenants.
(Rec. 15). A copy of the official ballot is contained in the Record. (Rec. 34-36).
15.

The Restrictive Covenants provide that as of January 1, 2004, they are

automatically renewed for an additional ten (10) year period. (Rec. 19, and Addendum.
Ex. "A", pg. 3).
16.

The Restrictive Covenants were never amended or terminated prior to

January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., at which time the next successive 10 year period
commenced. (Rec. 15).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The majority vote to terminate the Restrictive Covenants in this case, did
not occur until after January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., at which point the Covenants were
automatically extended for another ten (10) year renewal period. Since the ten (10) year
renewal period had already commenced at the start of January 1, 2004, and before the
vote was taken from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m. that same day, the vote taken was too late
and is ineffective to terminate the Covenants.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COVENANTS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE REQUIRE
THAT A MAJORITY VOTE TO TERMINATE TAKE PLACE
PRIOR TO 12:01 A.M. ON JANUARY 1, 2004 AT WHICH
TIME THE COVENANTS AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED.
A.

The Covenants were already renewed by noon
on January 1 2004. when the vote occurred.

It must not be forgotten that while restrictive covenants forbid or require
certain use of real property, they also confer vested rights in those owners who desire to
own property where the subject uses are either required or forbidden. One of these vested
rights is the method required to amend, change or abolish the covenants. In re Wallace's
Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okl.App. 1994).
Restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). The Interpretation of unambiguous

10

contractual terms is a question of law. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Assoc, v.
Wasatch City., 40 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001).
Unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written. It is the
court's duty to enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the plain language of
the covenants. Such language is to be taken in its ordinary, generally understood and
popular sense, and it is not to be subjected to technical refinement nor are the words to be
torn away from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon.
Holladay Duplex Mfg. Co. v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104 (Ut.App. 2003); Freeman v. Gee 423
P.2d 155 (Utah 1967).
The unambiguous terms of the Covenants in this case, provide that they
automatically renew for a successive ten (10) year period on January 1,2004. The
Covenants specifically provide as follows:
These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties
and all persons claiming under them until January 1, 1994, at which time said
covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of 10 years
unless by a vote of a majority of the then owners of the building sites covered by
these covenants it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or part. [Emphasis
added]. (Rec. 19, Addendum Ex. A, pg. 3).
This provision should be enforced as written. Other courts in reviewing
restrictive covenants, with the same language, have held that the amendment must be
voted on and ratified by the majority before the automatic renewal period commences.
City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992). Indeed, the word "until"
given its ordinary meaning is defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "a
11

function word to indicate the continuance of an action or condition to a specified date or
time." Other dictionaries define "until" as "up to a time or event, but not afterward," and
"before a time or event, but not afterward," and "up to the stated time, but not after," and
"prior to a stated time." See Merriam-Webster, Cambridge Advanced Learner
Dictionaries, and The Encarta Premier Dictionaries.
The Covenants in this case were to run with the land and be binding on all
parties and all persons claiming under them until January 1,1994, at which time they are
automatically renewed. Therefore, the word until as used in this section means up to, but
not including the day of January 1, 2004. This day could not be included, as on this day
the Covenants are automatically extended for another successive 10 year period; and this
Court in Swenson I, similar to other courts, has ruled that once such an extension occurs,
a majority vote cannot terminate or amend the Covenants until the end of the extension
period. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 815 (Utah 2000); City of Gulf Port v. Wilson,
603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393
(Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth
Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994).
The court in Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition, supra, dealt with this
same language and focused on the words "at which time" following the January 1st date.
The court held that the phrase "at which time," in paragraph 10 refers to the January 1st
date and time periods often years. The court further states that "this reference would be
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meaningless if the covenants could be amended by a majority vote at any time on or after
January 1, 1974." Id. at 821. Thus, the Covenants in this case, renewed on January 1st
2004, and the majority vote to terminate the Covenants on January 1,2004 occurred after
the Covenants were automatically renewed.
Another case dealing with this issue is Failla v. Meaux, 237 So.2d. 688
(La.App. 1970). In Failla v. Meaux the covenants were, "binding on the property until
January 1, 1966, at which time the said restrictions shall be automatically extended for
successive periods of 10 years without the necessity of any action whatsoever, unless by a
vote of a majority of owners of the lots in said subdivision it is agreed to change, alter or
discontinue any or all of said restrictions and covenants." In Fallia a majority of the
owners by instrument dated and recorded on December 30, 1965 amended the covenants.
This was challenged and the court ruled that the vote was effective, noting that had the
owners waited until January 1, 1966 to amend the covenants, the covenants would already
be renewed for another 10 years on that date and the amendment would not take effect
until January 1,1976.
Another case dealing with similar language is Mauldin v. Panella 17 P.3d
837 (Colo.App. 2000) wherein the covenants recorded on August 2, 1962, were effective
for 25 years until August 2, 1987, after which time said covenants shall be automatically
extended for successive periods often years, unless an instrument signed by a majority of
the then owners of all the lots in the subdivision has been recorded, agreeing to change
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said covenants in whole or in part. On August 4, 1997 a instrument was recorded
amending the covenants. This recording was too late. The court held that when on
August 2, 1997, the renewal period began, without amendments to the covenants having
previously been recorded, the original 1962 covenants were already automatically
extended for an additional 10 years. Id. at 839.
Other jurisdictions dealing with this issue and the same language as in this
case, which is commonly contained in restrictive covenants, have held that once the
renewal day begins without any vote for amendment or termination having taken place,
the automatic renewal period begins and any vote taken after this time is not effective.
Even the Defendants when they filed their Petition for Rehearing in the
previous appeal, recognized this long line of cases; and argued that if they met and voted
on January 1,2004, it would be too late, as the Covenants would already be automatically
renewed for an additional 10 year period. (Rec. 84, 105-106).l
The Covenants automatically renewed beginning January 1, 2004 at 12:01
a.m., for another 10 years; therefore, the vote to terminate occurring on January 1, 2004,
between noon and 2:00 p.m. is too late and is ineffective to terminate the Covenants.

^his issue was never addressed as the Petition for Rehearing was not granted.
Furthermore it did not help the Defendants at that time as the vote at issue before the
Court on the last appeal occurred in 1997 not on January 1, 2004
14

B.

This Court in Swenson I did not rule that a vote
to terminate must take place on January 1, 2004-

This Court in Swenson I Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 815 (Utah
2000) (Addendum, Ex. B hereto), did not rule that a vote to terminate the Covenants
would have to take place on one day, that being January 1, 2004. The Court stated:
Therefore, the owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at
such time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time was January 1,
1994, we assume that the next such time will be on January 1,2004. (Addendum,
Exhibit B,pg. 815)
In Swenson /the Defendants by majority vote tried to terminate the
Covenants on October 3, 1997. This Court recognized that the majority would not have
the power to amend or terminate the Covenants, until the Covenants were due for
extension, which would be on January 1, 2004. Thus, the date of January 1,2004 referred
to by the Court, is not a date given for a majority vote, but rather the date that the
Covenants were to be automatically extended.
The language in Swenson I, "we assume that the next such time will be on
January 1, 2004," is taken out of context by both the trial and appellate court. The
sentence immediately preceding this language reads, "the owners have the power to
amend the covenants, but only at such time as the covenants are due for extension."
(emphasis added). Therefore, read in context the statement provides, "we assume that the
next such time (the covenants are due for extension) will be on January 1, 2004. Again,
this date relates only to the date of extension. There is no directive by this Court in
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Swenson /that a majority vote to amend or terminate the Covenants must take place on
January 1,2004.2
Finally, the Court of Appeals states in paragraph 13 of its Opinion that, "the
Utah Supreme Court held that the intent of the parties was that changes to the Covenants
could only be made at the conclusion of those ten-year periods,..." (emphasis added).
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "conclusion" as the "last part of something; or
reaching the end of a formal agreement or deal." The Utah Supreme Court properly ruled
that changes to the Covenants, by majority vote, could only be made at the conclusion of
the ten year periods. However, the Utah Supreme Court did not state that the end of the
day on January 1, 2004 would be the conclusion of the next ten year period.
The drafters specifically prescribed January 1, 1994 as the beginning of the
first ten year renewal period. (Restrictive Covenants, Addendum Ex. A, Section XIV).
Therefore, the first ten year renewal period commenced on, and included January 1, 1994,
and thus came to its conclusion at days end on December 31, 2003. The Opinion by the
Utah Court of Appeals improperly extends the renewal period to ten years plus one day.
The Utah Supreme Court in Swenson /affirmed the right of the majority owners to vote to
terminate the Covenants, to take effect at the end of the ten year renewal period; but the
vote to terminate the Covenants, to take effect at of the end of the renewal period, must

2

It is the well settled policy of the Utah Supreme Court to avoid giving advisory
opinions in regards to issues which are unnecessary to resolve the claims before the
Court. Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 104 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2004).
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take place at a reasonable time prior to the start of the next renewal period. The Utah
Supreme Court did not hold that the vote to terminate must occur on January 1, 2004,
after the next ten year renewal period has already commenced.
C.

The ruling that the Covenants both automatically renewed and
can be terminated by majority vote on the same day. January 1.
2004, is inherently inconsistent.

The Opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals that the Covenants can
be automatically renewed and terminated by majority vote on the same day, January 1,
2004, is inherently inconsistent; and directly contrary to this Court's ruling in Swenson I
that any attempt to amend or terminate the Covenants by majority vote once automatic
renewal has occurred, will not be effective.
As stated above, according to the unambiguous terms of the Covenants,
they were automatically renewed for another 10 year period on January 1, 2004.
Therefore any majority vote to terminate the Covenants would have to take place before
January 1, 2004, when the next 10 year renewal period begins. City of Gulf Port v.
Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393
(Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth
Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994).
Furthermore, if both the automatic renewal period and a majority vote to
terminate the Covenants are allowed to take place on January 1,2004, as the Court of
Appeals has opined, and there is no specific time set forth for either to take place, how
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can the court determine which act is to take precedence? The automatic renewal of the
Covenants or the majority vote to terminate? The Utah Court of Appeals in its Opinion
states that the inclusion of only a date without a specific time suggests that the vote could
be taken any time that day,3 but such reasoning would also apply to the start of the
automatic renewal period. The Covenants do not provide that the renewal is to take place
at 3:00 p.m4., 5:00 p.m., midnight, or any time after a vote has occurred How can the
court find that the automatic renewal was not to occur until after the vote at 2:00 p.m. on
January 1, 2004? Indeed, the drafters did not establish a specific time, or date, for a vote
to take place. They did however, establish a date certain for the automatic renewal to
commence, that being January 1st. The time of 12:01 a.m. is implied with this date.. By
establishing such an automatic extension following a ten year period (ending at midnight

3

The reason there is no time set for the vote on January 1st, is that it was never
intended that the vote would have to take place on this one day, but would occur prior to
this renewal date, as the above cases have held.
4

The Covenants are renewed for a period often years and then automatically
renewed for another ten years at the end of each ten year period. For the renewal period
to be extended until 3:00 p.m or afterwards on January 1st, the Covenants would have to
provide that they are not renewed for ten years, but for a period of 10 years, plus 15
hours, etc... By simply specifying the ten year term, without any additional time on
January 1st for a vote to be taken, the drafters obviously intended that the Covenants
would be renewed at the stroke of 12:01 a.m. on January 1st, the beginning of a new year
and a new ten year period.
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on December 31st) the renewal would automatically become effective at the beginning of
January 1st, that is at 12:01 a.m., with the new ten year renewal period.5
Moreover, since the automatic renewal does not require any specific act to
take place, but the voting does, if both can occur on January 1st 2004, the conditions for
the automatic renewal would be met first; and therefore, it would occur and take effect
before any vote could take place later that day.6
D.

The interpretation that this Court ruled in Swenson I that the
vote must take place on January 1, 2004. is too limiting.

Taking the interpretation applied by the trial court and the Utah Court of
Appeals to this Court's ruling in Swenson I, that the only time that the majority can vote
to amend or terminate the Covenants is on January 1, 2004, would limit the time for the
majority owners to vote, to either amend or terminate the Covenants, to one single day.
It is improbable that the drafters intended to specify this one single day,
January 1st for such a vote to take place. It is a far more reasonable intent that the "then
owners" be able to vote within a reasonably short period of time before the automatic
renewal date of January 1st. See City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1992)

5

By ruling that the vote to terminate the Covenants can take place any time during
the day on January 1, 2004; the Court of Appeals is in effect rewriting the terms of the
Covenants changing the automatic renewal date from January 1st to January 2nd. This
ruling is contrary to the express terms of the Covenants and fails to enforce the Covenants
as clearly written.
6

Of course this situation is avoided with the proper interpretation of the Covenants
that the vote must take place before the automatic renewal date of January 1st 2004.
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wherein the court held that where a restrictive covenant was automatically extended for
successive periods often years, and is silent as to when the vote must take place, it was
reasonable for the amendment to be voted on before the expiration of the term so that the
covenant would not automatically renew for another ten years.7
The Utah Court of Appeals while concerned about the drafters not including
a specific time on January 1st when the automatic extension is to take effect, apparently
has no problem in rewriting the Covenants to limit the period for voting on the Covenants
to one single day, that being January 1st. This is done although the Covenants fail to
identify any specific date for such a vote to occur.
The better law and interpretation given to such language, as other courts
have done, is that the vote to amend or terminate the covenants should occur within a
reasonably short period of time before the expiration date of the term, so that it is an
accurate vote of the "then owners" and so that the covenants do not automatically renew
for another 10 year period. City of GulfPort v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992)
The voters in this case could have met several weeks before the January 1,
2004 renewal date, and voted to terminate the Covenants. Of course consistent with this

7

The court further stated that if the amendment was not already voted on and
ratified to go into effect on January 1, 1985, then the old covenant would automatically
renew on that date and go into effect for another 10 years. Id. at 300.
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Court's ruling in Swenson I, such termination, by majority vote, would not take effect
until at the end of the current 10 year period; however, this was never done.8
E.

It is not necessary for the Covenants to designate the exact time
of 12:01 a.m. on January 1. 2004, for automatic renewal.

The Utah Court of Appeals in its ruling states that the inclusion of only a
date for renewal without a specific time suggests that the vote to terminate could be taken
anytime that day. The Court of Appeals states, "If the drafters intended to impose a strict
12:01 a.m., deadline, the Covenants could have said so." However, such an imposition
would be redundant, and is not necessary or practical, since it is undisputed and known to
everyone, that January 1st would start at 12:01 a.m. The time of 12:01 a.m. would
therefore be implicit with the date of January 1st., and it would not be reasonable for the
drafters of the Covenants to set forth the exact time of 12:01 a.m. for the Covenants to be
renewed. Furthermore, if the drafters intended that the Covenants not be renewed until
after 2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2004, as the Court of Appeals holds, then they would have
explicitly provided for a time of 2:00 p.m. in the Covenants.
Since there is no time specified for the renewal of the Covenants, it is
improper for the Utah Court of Appeals to just assume that the renewal time must be
some time after 2:00 p.m., when the vote concluded in this case. This interpretation is

8

It must not be forgotten that one of the vested rights of an owner of real property,
subject to restrictive covenants, is the method required to amend, change or abolish the
restrictive covenants. In re Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821
(OkLApp. 1994).
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more strained than the 12:01 a.m. deadline implicit with the date. Indeed, the cases have
held that when there is no exact time specified for the renewal of restrictive covenants on
a certain date, the renewal takes place at the beginning of the day; and a vote taken later
that day is too late and is ineffective to amend or terminate the covenants. City of Gulf
Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. BlackhawkPartners, 999
P.2d 393 (Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's
Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994).
CONCLUSION
The Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed for another 10 year
period on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., and therefore, any vote taken on January 1, 2004
after the Covenants were renewed is of no effect.
This Court in Swenson /held that the majority did not have the power to
terminate the Covenants until they were due for extension on January 1, 2004. This Court
did not rule that the vote to terminate the Covenants must take place on January 1, 2004.
The ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals that the Covenants can be both
automatically renewed and terminated by majority vote on January 1, 2004, is inherently
inconsistent and contrary to this Court's ruling in Swenson L
Based on the forgoing the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals should be
reversed and the Notice of Termination filed on March 26, 2004, based on the alleged
majority vote on January 1, 2004, should be declared null and void.
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DATED this Z ^ d a y of June, 2006.
BOND & CALL, L.C.

&Q' L^dt^OC j>
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class,
TWO true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONERS this 2 . 0
day of June, 2006, to:
J. Thomas Bowen
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D102
Midvale, Utah 84047
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QUAIL POINT SUBDIVISION
RESTfilCTIVE COVENANTS

2553CS8

3J
41

KIBTON U*NDANX> INVESTMENT CORPORATION, * corporaiiOQ of Utah, with Ha principal pkcc of bvmiaeBS in Salt Lake Ctty, Salt
1-a.fcc County, State of Utah, aad HAROLD M. CAMPBZLL aod MA R3T
CAMPBELL, hie vile, the owner* of the following described real property actuated In Salt Lake County, Slate of Utah, to-"wil:

5
6
7i

Lots 1 through 52, QUAIL POINT SUBDIVISION, a subdivision of Salt LaJce
County, State of Utah, according to the
official plat thereof on file and of record
In the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder;

8
f
1D
J)

does hereby pUce the hereinafter designated restriction covenants upon
ail of the lour of Bs.Ld subdivision.

XZi
13
U.

Lota 1 through 52 shall be known a* "residential lots." J&x
ftrgctare ghall he erected, altered, p k c e d o r permitted to rcoam on
* n y_rcsidential i o t " l ^
WiI7~d>elUng, a,
^tiogara£e, *_guest
a. guest hoosl
ancf out
build IRVB for
for pet*
rx-t* a*
a* hereina/ter"
h^ln.L^
^OXatiogara^e,
hooB^a^J
outbuildings
described.
"~
•
—•—
•
—

1*1

n
13

-

^
No residential structure, nor any part thereof shall bc erected
Altered, placed or permitted to remain on anj parcel of land containing
ieaa than an entire residential lot (unless- *ald parcel ahaJU have a vldth
of at least 105 feel al the front bnilding set b*clc line*.

-

*
No button* shall be erected, pkeed, or altered on ary premises
m a»M development until the bulldln* p U w , npec.flc^lonfi. md plo. p W
l o c a l I o n
n m g
°'*"ch building have b«eu approved u to conformity
and Harmony of external design with existing structure in the dcvclop-

IS

23
24
U

flS
J
* * !f 1 f C a t i ° n °* t h c b u i l d i ^ ^ t b a s p e c t to topography *nd
"£U.tie,d ground e l e v e n by an BJrcJtuUctur*! committee co»pOBCd Df
LUARLES R_ KDEtTON u.d o t W m e m b e r selected by Wjtn or by a repre
-*rvtetlve d^ignated by tbo member-, of .«W c o m m i t s * . £a the r v c « o f
: Z l ° r rC'i£lUttl°n * ^
"wmber. of « I d committee, the remaining

Mi
»J

" S o r i T v V S ° C a t l ° t t ' ° r *° d « 1 « a « « « representative ^
-v^tl
, ! ^ ^ ^ t h c m o t n b « ™ °* « " committee die

X8
*°entl^
or dla!^,

W
llJte
o r l n

thc

* u b d i , v l i ' l O T * h ^ h ^ « tbe right to elect a commute*. In
^ t t « « . or lt» d e l a t e d KpreaeaUlIn ftfl, to a P pror«

CDm

30
r«qul«d r ! / £ r
Tlth.
MoCOKKl*.

««PJ»tIoa thereor. nuch approval vtU not be

Neither the members of such

auiuLLiJULLL H J I iiu Utumated

*
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e shall be entitled to ariy c o m p e n s a t i o n for aervicee p e r f o r m e d
p u r B o n n t to this corencant. This c o m m i t t e e s h a l l h a v e the right to wry t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s BJ? set forth JD Section IT, but s a i d v a r i a n c e shall not be valid
u n l e s s obtained in writing.

n
IBcory detached single .family d u e l l i n g e r e c t e d on any one of the
fiJbove-described
rc*ldenti$d. lotc BhxH h a v e a rmoimuco a r e * above the
g r o u n d o£ 1,250 j&qa&re feet, exclauiva of g a r a g e s and open porchea. No
two— jstory s t r u c t u r e s uhall be built on a n y lot without t h e eocpreEs cone eat
of The u r c h i t e c t u r a l committee- Said consent s h a l l b e granted only -where
it 1B d e e m e d by ihe architect oral corruaaittee that the s e c o n d story s h a l l not
a d v e r s e l y affect the vie-v of the city o r moimt&JnB f r o m the other lotfiIII
N o outbuilding «hell be erected., a l t e r e d , p l a c e d or perrijltted
to r e o i i n n e a r e r than eight (B) feet to e i t h e r s i d e line of A lot unless TXO
p o r t i o n of s a i d building extends neE.rer to the s t r e e t l i n e than eb^y-flve (S3)
leetT h e m i n i m u m -clae ^srd far a n y dwelling" a b a l l be eight (S) feet-

*
IV
Of j
16

No r e s i d e n t i a l fitrccicre shall be e r e c t e d o r placed on ajy building
site,, -which h&e a a a r e a oi l e s s then 8,000 s q u a r e feet-

T7

IB

rp

*

N o noxious o r offensive t r a d e o r a c t i v i t y gftfl.ll be carried on ttpoa
Any b u i l d i n g s i t e i>or shall anything be done t h e r e o n which m a y be o r b e c o m e a n -Rraxyyance o r nnlsaxice to the n e i g h b o r h o o d .
VI

zi
7JL

N o t n a i l e r , baeeroent, tent, shaclc, g&riLgc> ba.rn o r other o u t b u i l d i n g e r e c t e d on a building 6vie c o v e r e d by t h e e c covenante snail at sjny
t i m e be txned for h u m a n habitation t e m p o r a r i l y o r p e r m a n e n t l y , o&r erhall
Any S t r u c t u r e of a t e m p o r a r y ch»r«Arut.^3r b e u s e d f o r hupa* n habttrxKon-

vn
m«
Z7

za
z»
*o
31 j
M

Ka^erncnta ar«> reserved RE ebo'wn on tho r o c o r d e d pl»t Inr nrilitjr
loHtGLllAtioo^ p i p e l i n e s , diteheB, and* toualatojJBa>oc. Nothing LU this p a r a g r a p h c o n t a i n e d • b a l l be interpreted A S p r o h i b i t i n g cornet ruction of -walk*,.
drlrcrw^yB,
porches,
e t c . , over *n_ch c a s e r n c a t s , a a b j e c t to the rights at
t h o s e Trith cafitorncnte t o male* Tvac*»flary r e p a i r s «Ltjd condact n*cee a a r y
m*ttrt'«-oja_.n.Oo a t o o g - «ucJK oiL*<Dn>c:n.t».

VDOC
N o a n i m a l * o r p o u l t r y of a n y kJLrud o t h e r t h a n hou£N> p c t » *H«*UI b o

OTC truant*, load on any part of said p r o p e r t y .

tept

82
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IX
~*-A n l a . c e d o r a l t e r e d o n a n j lot
N o f e o c e o r w a l l shall b e e r t c t e d , p *
fiett>ack
U l , e -without
nearer to *ny Bt«et than tb* minimum building setbac
approval as hereinafter set forth.
- - rtn f^^t- In height flha1! be
No fence, *alls, or hedge over six W ieet
^ 5 however, that
erected or grown at any place on said premise - P
o r ' a u l l l f l c d by
the restriction aet forth in lUa *«tion raay be vr*
t h w l fifty (50)
cogent of architectural committee or by t h e ^ ° ^ b t D a t > e d m waUnj.
percent of the numbered lots within ttuB .abdWlslon ot»to
X
KO structure « * * ! be moved on to any " - ^ J ^ ^ f J 1 1 0
hereinbefore described or any P ^ T I r ,h fee I ^ h o l d e r * of other lot.
approrai of ooe hundred percent (100%) of the ? « ^ Jf *
i n W s subdivision, such approval to be *,v«a m ^ K . * * .
XI
„ o . * a of , D y kind **H * d i ^ y e d ^
£
*
* £ , ? , £
lot except ooe profession*! .l«a o not ^ " . ^ ^ L ^ p e r l y *r « 1 .
Bi^n of not more than five sjnare feet, advertls ng °*. ^ J " ^ , . ; ^ « „ _
or rent, or signs uaCd by builder to a d v e r t s tb= property
struetiOD and aal-es period.

xn
of any idnd, or quancytog *U1 not be permuted apoo or » « 7
bnlMfa* stte» In the true, deecr,bed herein^nor *haU oU J l .
tunnels, mineral excavBtlow or shafts be permitted upon or
bu&dlcig- s i t e s c o v e r e d by theee c o v e n a n t s .

o ^
^

XUI

material ehall be kept u> a dean sod aanitary conditioXIV
These c o v e r t . .re to r.o with the W and shaU bo b « W on
all parties aud all P cr,one claiming under them «alll January 1 ^
at
which time .aid covenant, ahull be automatically f " ^ f ' ° / J ^ f " ^
period* of 10 yoara unlca. by vote of a majority of tfc« theo o*n.r. o<. « «
bSwm* eilcs covered by these covenant* U I. **r«cd to changeaald cove
rants in whDlo or part.
-^fc
If th« paurtlcB hereto, M y of them, or their h*Ir«. «
^ ™ '
JysxM trJLol^tc or- A t t e m p t to vLol*.lc -jcry o f t h e c o v e r x ^ t d h e r e i n it PO*XL
be UirfQl for *ny other pcroon or pcrfiona o^mW *^y r*>a P ^ c r t *
*itaatcd In *ald tract, to prosecute any proceeding *t l a ^ o- tn cq y
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to rotate a n j ^
l e m P t i 0 £
.
tflol^tingor
^
!
or
to
recover
K n6
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CORPORATION auu 4J _
V7\fc. ha^e h e r e u n t o s e t their "haads and official s e a l t b l t
J u l y 1973

^ T O N X ^ N D AND INVESTMENT
KIRT
CORPOBATIO^
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1

^

C o u n t y of Salt L » * *
)
a p p « r f d before n^c
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SWENSON v. ERICKSON

Utah
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Cite as 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000)

2000 UT 16
David and Barbara SWENSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

was in effect grant of summary judgment in
of
movant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
12(b)(6), 56.

favor

2. Appeal and Error <3=>863, 934(1)
David V. ERICKSON, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 980075.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 19, 2000.
Rehearing Denied March 29, 2000.
Neighbors brought action to enjoin
property owner's construction of building and
to compel him to remove portion of building
already constructed, alleging that such construction violated subdivision's restrictive
covenants. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Anne M. Stirba, J., granted temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and subsequently found that
building did not violate covenants and dismissed neighbors' compliant. Neighbors appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held
that: (1) restrictive covenant limiting permissible stinctures to single family homes, guest
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets,
expressly prohibited construction of building
erected by property owner; (2) erection of
small storage sheds by 19 of 52 property
owners in subdivision in violation of covenant
did not result in abandonment of covenant;
(3) approval of building by subdivision's architectural committee did not relieve owner
of obligation to comply with covenant; and (4)
petition circulated by property owner and
signed by majority of subdivision residents
did not terminate subdivision's restrictive
covenants.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
*• Judgment e=>183, 186
Where trial court and parties relied extensively on materials beyond allegations of
c
°toplaint in proceeding on motion to dismiss
tor failure to state a claim, that motion was
Implicitly converted to motion for summary
Judgment, and grant of motion to dismiss

On review of a summary judgment motion, the Supreme Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and will affirm only where
it appears that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material issues of fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56.
3. Covenants ^69(1)
Restrictive covenants that run with the
land and encumber subdivision lots form a
contract between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners;
therefore, interpretation of the covenants is
governed by the same rules of construction
as those used to interpret contracts.
4. Covenants <S=^49
Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written;
however, where restrictive covenants are
susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, the intention of the parties
is controlling.
5. Covenants <5=>49
The intention of the parties to a restrictive covenant is ascertained from the document itself and the language used within the
document.
6. Covenants e=>69(2)
Subdivision's restrictive covenant which
limited permissible structures to single family homes, guest houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets, expressly prohibited construction of building erected by property
owner for use as wood shop and for storage.
7. Appeal and Error <3>S42(8)
The trial court's interpretation of the
language of a restrictive covenant, absent
resort to extrinsic evidence, presents a question of law which the Supreme Court reviews
for correctness.
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8. Covenants <3=>69(2)
Even if subdivision's restrictive covenant
barring human occupation of any "trailer,
basement, tent, shack, garage [or] barn" expanded list of permissible structures beyond
those enumerated in covenant limiting such
structures to single family homes, guest
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets,
building erected by subdivision resident for
use as wood shop and for storage did not fall
within any description of pei'missible structures contained in either covenant.

15. Covenants 3>72.1
If the original purpose of a restrictive
covenant can still be accomplished despite
violations, and substantial benefit will continue to inure to residents, the covenant win
stand.
16. Covenants <s=>122
Evidence of abandonment of a restrictive covenant must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
17. Covenants ^72.1

9. Covenants e=>49
Under the well-established rule of construction ejusdem generis, general language
must be confined to its meaning by specific
enumeration which proceeds it, unless a contrary intention is shown.

No abandonment of a restrictive covenant will be found where violations are of a
minor nature and do not destroy the general
building scheme, if the violations are slight,
unimportant, and unsubstantial, or if the violations are inoffensive.

10. Covenants <£=>49
It is the Supreme Court's duty to enforce the intentions of covenanting parties as
expressed in the plain language of the covenants.

18. Covenants <s=>72.1
In determining whether violations of a
particular restrictive covenant have resulted
in its abandonment, the court must examine:
(1) the number, nature and severity of the
then existing violations; (2) any prior act of
enforcement of the restriction; and (3) whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial
degree the benefits intended through the
covenant.

11. Covenants <s=>77.1
Property owners who purchase land in
developments subject to restrictive covenants
have a right to enforce such covenants
against other owners who violate them.
12. Covenants <5=>72.1
Conduct by property owners within a
development may terminate and render unenforceable a particular restrictive covenant,
where such conduct so substantially changes
the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the benefit of the covenant, or constitutes evidence of the abandonment of the
covenant.
13. Covenants e=>72.1
Abandonment of a restrictive covenant
may be found where there has been substantial and general noncompliance with the covenant.
14. Covenants <3=>72.1
In order to constitute abandonment of a
restrictive covenant, the violations of the covenant must be so substantial as to destroy its
usefulness and support a finding that the
covenant has become burdensome.

19. Covenants <3=>72.1
Erection of small storage sheds by 19 of
52 property owners in subdivision, in violation of restiictive covenant limiting permissible structures to single family homes, guest
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets
did not result in abandonment of covenant,
where storage sheds had average size of
eight by ten feet and were approximately
seven and one-half feet in height, were not
placed on permanent foundations, were not
inhabited, and typically fit unobtrusively in
back corner of lot.
20. Covenants <^72.1
Approval by subdivision's architectural
committee of building erected by property
owner for use as wood shop and for storage
did not relieve owner of obligation to comply
with restrictive covenant limiting permissible
structures to single family homes, guest
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets.
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21. Covenants <5=>73
Petition circulated by property owner
and signed by majority of subdivision residents, which attempted to terminate subdivision's restrictive covenants, was ineffective
for that purpose, where covenants specifically
provided that they would be terminated by
majority vote of subdivision property owners
only at specific ten-year intervals.

Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
J. Thomas Bowen, Midvale, for defendant.
HOWE, Chief Justice:
111 Plaintiffs David and Barbara Swenson
appeal from the trial court's dissolution of
their preliminary injunction against defendant David Erickson and the dismissal of
their complaint against him. The court ruled
that the woodworking shop that Erickson
constructed did not violate the restrictive
covenants governing the subdivision in which
Erickson and the Swensons live, and that the
Swensons' claims became moot after the representative of an architectural committee approved Erickson's structure.

H 3 In July 1997, having notified Erickson
that the structure would violate the restrictive covenants, and having given him written
notice of their intent to legally oppose the
building, the Swensons brought this action to
enjoin Erickson's construction and to compel
him to remove the building. Erickson, however, proceeded, completing much of the
structure by mid-August.
11 4 In August 1997, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order and, in September, granted the Swensons a preliminary injunction precluding Erickson from further
work on or in the structure. After the preliminary injunction issued, two of the original appointed members of the architectural
committee, Mary Campbell and Charles R.
Kirton, designated Robert Campbell as the
sole representative of the committee.
Campbell then formally approved Erickson's
structure as to its external design, location,
and finished ground elevation. Campbell
also circulated a petition among Quail Point
homeowners to terminate the restrictive covenants. Owners of thirty-eight of the fiftytwo Quail Point lots signed the petition.
Campbell then recorded a notice of termination of the restrictive covenants with the
Salt Lake County recorder.

115 Erickson next moved pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss
the Swensons' complaint and dissolve the
BACKGROUND
temporary restraining order, asserting that
11 2 The Swensons and Erickson own ad- the termination of the covenants rendered
joining lots in Quail Point Subdivision in Salt the Swensons' complaint for breach of the
Lake County. Quail Point lots are subject to covenants moot. The Swensons in turn
restrictive covenants recorded in July 1973. moved to nullify the notice of termination.
In July or August 1997, Erickson commenced The trial court granted Erickson's motion
the construction of a building on his lot that and set aside the preliminary injunction after
he intended to use as a woodworking shop concluding that the covenants did not prohiband private storage facility. The structure is it Erickson's workshop, and that Campbell's
approximately 288 to 384 square feet and 12 appi*oval of the workshop subsequent to the
feet high. Erickson did not obtain preappro- preliminary injunction rendered the Swenval from the subdivision's architectural com- sons' claims moot.
Article I of the covenants provides in part:
mittee for this structure, as required by the
restrictive covenants.1 However, the committee had not functioned for the previous
No structure shall be erected, altered,
twentv-three vears, if it ever functioned at
placed or permitted to remain on any ''resall.
idential lot" other than one detached single
1- Under article I of the covenants, no structure
ma\ beerected, placed or altered on any premises in
[Quail Point] until the building plans, specifications, and plot plans showing the location of
such building have been approved as to con-

lormity and harmony of external design with
existing structures in the development, and as
to location of the budding with respect to topography and finished ground elevation b\ an
architectural committee
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family dwelling, a private garage, a guest
house, and outbuildings for pets as hereinafter described....
With respect to setback requirements for
outbuildings, article III requires:
No outbuilding shall be erected, altered,
placed or pennitted to remain nearer than
eight (8) feet to either side line of a lot
unless no portion of said building extends
nearer to the street line than sixty-five (66)

feet.
Finally, article VI prohibits the use of certain
structures for human habitation on Quail
Point lots:
No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage,
barn or other outbuilding erected on a
building site covered by these covenants
shall at any time be used for human habitation temporarily or permanently, nor
shall any structure of a temporary character be used for human habitation.
116 By 1997, before Erickson built his
structure, there had been erected on approximately nineteen of fifty-two Quail Point lots
small storage-type sheds and other similar
structures that did not qualify as single-family dwellings, private garages, guest houses,
or outbuildings for pets.
117 The Swensons appeal, contending that
(1) the restrictive covenants prohibit the
erection of Erickson's workshop; (2) Robert
Campbell, the representative of the architectural committee, did not have the authority
to relieve Erickson of complying with the
covenants; (3) if Campbell or the committee
had that authority, Erickson did not obtain
preapproval from him or the committee to
erect the workshop as required by the covenants; and (4) the notice of termination is
invalid and cannot immediately terminate the
covenants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] 118 This case comes to this court following the trial court's grant of a rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Erickson. However, in granting the 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court and the parties relied
extensively on materials beyond the allega-

tions of the complaint. Where outside matters are "presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b).
11 9 In their briefs and at oral arguments to
this court, both parties again rely extensively
on evidence from the preliminary hearing,
affidavits, and supporting documents. Because from the outset the parties have submitted extraneous materials and treated the
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, neither party was prejudiced or
unfairly surprised by the trial court's implicit
conversion of Erickson's 12(b)(6) motion into
a motion for summary judgment. See DOIT,
Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835,
838-39 n. 3 (Utah 1996) (citing World Peace
Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 256 n. 2 (Utah 1994);
Warren v. Provo City Corp,, 838 P.2d 1125,
1127 n. 2 (Utah 1992); Johnson v. Motion
Thiokol Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991)).
Therefore, we treat the trial court's order as
a summary judgment for Erickson.
[2] 1110 On review of a summary judgment motion, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and affirm only where it appears that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material
issues of fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Thayne
v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124
(Utah 1994) (citing Themy v. Seagull Enters.
Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979)). We
review the trial court's legal determinations
for correctness. See Geisdorf v. Doughty,
972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998).
ANALYSIS

I. STRUCTURES PROHIBITED
UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
[3-6] 1111 We first address whether
Quail Point's restrictive covenants prohibit
the erection of Erickson's workshop. Re"
strictive covenants that run with the land and
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ncumber subdivision lots form a contract
etween subdivision property owners as a
•hole and individual lot owners; therefore,
iterpretation of the covenants is governed
y the same rules of construction as those
sed to interpret contracts. See Smith Shore
lomes Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan.
14, 549 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1976); Gosnay v.
ig Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666
.2d 1247, 1250 (1983); Tompkins v. Buttm Constr. Co. of Nev., 99 Nev. 142, 659
.2d 865, 866 (1983); 9 Richard R. Powell,
oivell on Real Property § 60.05, at 60-82
>atrick J. Rohan ed., 1998); 20 Am.Jur.2d
ovenants § 170, at 591 (1995). Generally,
lambiguous restrictive covenants should be
lforced as written. However, where rerictive covenants are susceptible to two or
ore reasonable interpretations, the inten)n of the parties is controlling. See Powell,
ipra, § 60.05, at 60-82. The intention of
e parties is ascertained from the document
self and the language used within the docuent. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Asc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Powell,
pro, § 60.05, at 60-82.

effect to the covenants as a whole, the trial
court held that, as a matter of law, the
covenants do not prohibit the building of
Erickson's workshop. The court reasoned
that the term "outbuildings for pets" in article I "is not limited to those buildings that
only house pets, but, rather, the term includes trailers, tents, shacks, garages, barns,
and the like." The trial court's interpretation of the language of a restrictive covenant,
absent resort to extrinsic evidence, presents
a question of law which we review for correctness. See, e.g., Buehner, 752 P.2d at 895.

1113 The Swensons contend that article I
specifically limits what structures may be
built in Quail Point. Article VI, although
referring to other buildings, specifically prohibits human habitation and does not expand
the types of structures permitted under article I. Therefore, the Swensons argue, specific
limitations in article I prescribing the structures Quail Point owners may build should
prevail over the general language of article
VI prohibiting the use of certain structures
for human habitation. Erickson contends
[7] H 12 Article I of the covenants pro- that if only the four types of structures in
les in relevant part, "No structure shall be article I are permitted, the terms used in
,ered, placed or permitted to remain on any article VI (i.e., trailer, tent, shack, barn, or
k
sidential lot' other than one detached sin- other outbuilding) are rendered superfluous.
> family dwelling, a private garage, a guest He also argues that the use of the term
use, and outbuildings for pets as hereinaf- "outbuilding" in article III and its concern
- described." The parties do not dispute that outbuildings not be located within eight
*t Erickson's workshop does not fit neatly feet of a lot's side line unless they are sixtythin those four types of structures. The five feet from the street implicitly suggests
nfusion surrounding what structures may
that the drafters of the covenants intended to
erected arises from language contained in
allow outbuildings other than for pets, such
ler articles of the covenants. Specifically,
as sheds, barns, and workshops.
:icle VI requires that "[n]o trailer, basest, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out[8] 1114 A plain reading of articles I and
ilding erected on a building site covered by
VI
reveals two distinct purposes. Article Fs
?se covenants shall at any time be used for
primary
purpose is to limit the types of
man habitation temporarily or permanentstructures
permitted on a residential lot in
nor shall any structure of a temporary
Quail
Point.
On this point, article I is clear
iracter be used for human habitation."
and
unambiguous;
Quail Point homeowners
tide III addresses outbuildings further,
may
erect
four
permanent
structures on their
luiring that "[n]o outbuilding shall be
k
lots:
(1)
a
single
family
dwelling;
(2) a pricted, altered, placed or permitted to revate
garage;
(3)
a
guest
house;
and (4)
in nearer than eight (8) feet to either side
outbuildings
for
pets.
Article
VFs
primary
2 of a lot unless no portion of said building
ends nearer to the street line than sixty- purpose is to prohibit human habitation of
5 (65) feet.'' On the basis of its reading of any structures other than a main dwelling or
icles VI and III, and in an effort to give a guest house, as permitted by article I.
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1115 Close scrutiny of the language in article VI, however, diminishes the apparent inconsistency between article I and article VI
Ube of the term "building site" instead of
"residential lot" in article VI suggests that
the drafters weie concerned with preventing
either builders or futuie homeowners from
living in partially completed buildings (eg,
basements, garages, shacks, barns, or other
outbuildings) or movable structures (eg,
trailers or tents) during prolonged construction on a residential lot or othei unforeseen
delay, or with preventing homeowners from
changing the single-family residential character of the subdivision by having persons occupy buildings other than the main dwelling
or guest house The fact that article VI lists
three permanent structures (l e, shacks,
barns, or other outbuildings) not otherwise
allowed under article I is not determinative,
as the overriding intent of article VI is to
prevent human habitation of additional structures
[9] 1116 It is also evident from the language of the covenants that Enckson's woikshop does not fit neatly within the common
and ordinary meaning of "trailer, basement,
tent, shack, garage [or] barn" contained in
article VI Accordingly, even assuming that
article VI expands the allowable structures
under the covenants, the only term that could
be read to allow the erection of Enckson's
woi kshop is "other outbuildings " 2 It is not
this court's practice to override specific language with general provisions dealing with
wholly distinct subject matter Under the
well-established rule of construction ejusdem
generis, general language must be confined
to its meaning by specific enumeration which
pioceeds it, unless a contrary intention is
shown See Pamsh v Richards, 8 Utah 2d
419, 421-22, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959), Edwin
Q Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum L Rev
S33, 853 (1964) Here, no contrary intention
ib shown by any language of the covenants,
and allowing the expansive reading put forth
by Enckson would render the clear and explicit limitation in article I meaningless The
effect of Enckson's position would be to ev
2

Generally an outbuilding is something which
is to be used in connection with a main building

pand the four explicit allowable structures in
article I to an infinite number of structures
that could be said to qualify as "other outbuildings" under article VI The drafteis
could not have intended such a result
K 17 Finally, Enckson argues that because
article III lequires that no outbuilding be
erected nearer than eight feet to either side
line of a lot unless no portion of the building
is within sixty-five feet of the street line
suggests that Enckson's workshop is permissible under the covenants According to Erlckson, "[I]t is ludicrous to believe that the
drafters of the covenants were concerned
that a dog house might be located nearer to
the street than 65 feet"
1118 Enckson's mtei pretation of article III
is untenable First, article III does not contradict the explicit limitations in article I on
those structures that Quail Point lot owners
may build Article I allows a single family
dwelling, a guest house, a pnvate garage,
and outbuildings for pets, and in no way
contradicts article Ill's requirement that
these outbuildings be erected no closer than
eight feet fi om either side line of a lot unless
they are sixty-five feet from the street line
Second, article III does not prohibit the location of outbuildings within sixty-five feet of
the street line, as Enckson suggests An
outbuilding must be at least sixty-five feet
from the street line only if it is within eight
feetofthe side line of the lot
MIO] /U 19 Finally, it is not for this court to
aiecopd-guess the judgment of covenanting
parties by including setback requirements for
particular structures It is this court's duty
to enforce the intentions of the parties as
expressed m the plain language of the covenants See Freeman v Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339,
345, 423 P2d 155, 159 (1967) The most
reasonable interpretation of the Quail Point
covenants is that they expressly prohibit the
erection of Enckson's building because it is
not a single family dwelling, a guest house, a
pnvate garage, or an outbuilding for pets
II

ABANDONMENT OF RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
H 20 Enckson contends that even if article
I prohibits his structure, that covenant has
or which is subservient to it although distinct
theiefrom 20 Am Jur 2d Covenants § 181
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been abandoned by Quail Point owners. We
therefore address whether Quail Point lot
owners have abandoned the restrictions, as
evidenced by their construction of numerous
other structures, mainly small storage-type
sheds and other similar structures, since recordingJJi^ covenants in 1973.
1121 Restrictive covenants are a
rfmon method of effectuating private residential developmental schemes. See Powell,
supra, § 60.06[3], at 60-104 to 60-112.
Property owners who purchase land in such
developments have a right to enforce such
covenants against other owners who violate
them. See Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d
478, 480-81 (Utah 1981); Powell, supra,
§ 60.07[c], at 60-121. Conduct by property
owners within a development, however, may
terminate and render unenforceable a particular covenant where such conduct so substantially changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the benefit of the
covenant, see Crimmins, 636 P.2d at 479, or
constitutes evidence of the abandonment of
the covenant. See Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d
649, 653 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
[13-16] 1122 The case law is uniform that
before an abandonment of a covenant may be
found there must be "substantial and general
noncompliance" with the covenant. B.B.P.
Corp. v. Carroll 760 P.2d 519, 524 (Alaska
1988); Tompkins, 659 P.2d at, 867. One
court has stated that in order for there to be
an abandonment, a covenant must be "habitually and substantially violated." Reading v.
Keller, 67 Wash.2d S6, 406 P.2d 634, 637
(1965) (internal quotations omitted). The violations must be so substantial as to destroy
the usefulness of the covenant and support a
finding that the covenant has become burdensome. See Keller v. Branton, 667 P.2d
650, 654 (Wyo.1983). If the original purpose
of the covenant can still be accomplished and
substantial benefit will continue to inure to
residents, the covenant will stand. See
Tompkins, 659 P.2d at 867. This court in
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1975), in determining whether a
covenant should no longer be enforceable
because of changed conditions, stated:

Before a change will vitiate a covenant, it
must be of such a magnitude as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction, to the
point of defeating the object and purpose
of the restrictive covenant. The change
required to afford relief is reached, where
the circumstances render the covenant of
little or no value. Here, the purpose of the
restriction is yet a valid one, and the contemplated benefits to the plaintiff still exist. The purpose of the covenant has neither ceased nor become useless.
Id. at 1261 (citing Metropolitan Inv. Co. v.
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 41, 376 P.2d 940, 943
(1962)). Evidence of abandonment must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
See Metropolitan, 14 Utah 2d at 41, 376 P.2d
at 943.
[17] 1123 Courts are uniform that no
abandonment of a covenant will be found
where violations are of a "minor nature" and
do not destroy the general building scheme,
see Reading, 406 P.2d at 636; if the violations are "slight, unimportant, and unsubstantial," Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125
So.2d 365, 371 (1960); or if the violations are
"inoffensive." See Keller, 667 P.2d at 654.
11 24 Typical of the cases where an abandonment of a covenant has been found is
B.B.P., 760 P.2d 519. There, a covenant
required all lot owners to cut and destroy all
poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees on their
lots to make room for the more desirable
spruce and birch. See id. at 520. However,
lot owners learned through experience that
strict compliance was impossible because
poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees are extremely hardy, and they sprout from roots
and reseed themselves. Even bulldozing all
of those trees would not bring a lot into
compliance because they would soon spring
back, and bulldozing would cause excessive
erosion. See id. at 521. As a result, none of
the lots were in full compliance with the
covenant, and only eighteen of the approximately eighty-eight residents had taken substantial steps toward compliance. See id.
The court held that the covenant had been
abandoned because the evidence revealed
substantial and general noncompliance. The
court noted that in order to fully comply,
each resident would be required to cut and
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thin trees each year, far exceeding the cutting that was apparently contemplated by the
covenant originally. Thus, the residents
would be subject to a far heavier burden than
they originally bargained for. Full compliance was found to be impossible to achieve
and even substantial compliance would be
extremely burdensome. See id. at 524.
1125 In contrast to that case where an
abandonment of a covenant was found, the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Keller, 667 P.2d
650, found no abandonment of a covenant
which prohibited front yard fencing. Twenty
lots out of approximately 120 to 130 lots had
some kind of front yard fence. They were
decorative fences, and the court held that
they were not fences in the ordinary sense of
indicating boundaries or holding something
in or out. See id. at 654. The court emphasized that in order to find an abandonment of
a protective covenant, the breaches acquiesced in must be so great or so fundamental or radical as to neutralize the benefit of
the restriction to the point of defeating the
purpose of the covenant. "In other words,
the violations must be so substantial as to
support a finding that the usefulness of the
covenant has been destroyed, or that the
covenant has become valueless to the property owners." Id.
1126 Courts have also found that the erection of churches in a subdivision restricted to
residential purposes technically violated the
covenant, but the violation was too slight and
inconsequential to effect material change,
character, and use of the restricted territory.
See, e.g., Mechling v. Daivson, 234 Ky. 318,
28 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1930). Similarly, in Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943
(1958), the Supreme Court of Texas held that
even though the subdivision had allowed several churches to be built there in violation of
a covenant restricting the use of the lots for
residential purposes the violation was so trivial in character that it did not operate as a
waiver of the right of lot owners to enforce
the covenant against business or commercial
development, and it did not indicate an abandonment of the covenant. See id. at 946.
[18] 1127 Thus, we adopt the test articulated by the court of appeals in Fink, 896
P.2d 649 for determining whether the owners

in Quail Point Subdivision have abandoned
the restrictive covenants. We must examine:
(1) the "number, nature and severity of the
then existing violations"; (2) "any prior act of
enforcement of the restriction"; and (3)
"whether it is still possible to realize to a
substantial degree the benefits intended
through the covenant." Id. at 653-54.
[19] 1128 In the instant case, nineteen of
fifty-two Quail Point lots had garden and
storage sheds that did not comply with the
four building types allowed under article I.
While the building of small storage sheds
may technically violate article I, the violation
is unsubstantial. The evidence indicates that
the storage sheds have an average size of
eight by ten feet and are approximately seven and a half feet in height, having an average of ninety-one square feet. These small
sheds typically fit unobtrusively in a back
corner of the lot, not on a foundation, and are
used to store garden and yard tools. They
are not occupied by lot owners and could be
not much larger than an outbuilding for pets,
which is expressly allowed under the covenant.
1129 On the other hand, the woodshop built
by defendant Erickson stands twelve feet
high and is substantially larger than a storage shed. The building contains at least 288
square feet and may be as large as 384
square feet. It has a foundation and is occupied by Erickson for woodworking. Erickson testified that he intends to move his
bandsaw into the workshop and buy other
power tools. The Swensons' and Erickson's
lots adjoin at the rear. The Swensons are
directly impacted by the large structure built
by Erickson.
V30 There is a substantial difference between a small, unobtrusive, unoccupied and
readily movable storage shed in the corner of
a lot and a substantially larger and taller
woodworking shop. The technical violation
of the covenant here, the small storage
sheds, can in no wise be deemed an abandonment. The original purpose of the covenant
can still be accomplished, and substantial
benefit can continue to inure to residents or
the subdivision. The slight violation by lot
owners in erecting small, unoccupied storage
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sheds does not render the covenant useless.
See Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1261.
There is no other occupied structure in the
subdivision comparable to the large shop
built by Erickson in which to conduct woodworking. We thus conclude that there has
been no abandonment of the restrictive covenants by the lot owners.
III. APPROVAL OF PLANS
[20] 1131 In article I of the covenants,
provision is made for the appointment and
duties of an architectural committee:
No building shall be erected, placed, or
altered on any premises in said development until the building plans, specifications, and plot plans showing the location
of such building have been approved as to
conformity and harmony of external design
with existing structures in the development, and as to location of the building
with respect to topography and finished
ground elevation by an architectural committee composed of CHARLES R. KIRTON and other members selected by him
or by a representative designated by the
members of said committee.
After the district court granted a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction against Erickson, and after he had erected his workshop, he sought to comply with
this covenant. Mary Campbell and Charles
R. Kirton, the two surviving members of the
original architectural committee, designated
Robert Campbell as the committee's representative. Robert Campbell then formally
approved Erickson's shed. However, this
approval avails Erickson nothing, for two
reasons.
H 32 First, the covenant requires that the
architectural committee or its designated
representative approve the building plan prior to the erection of any building on the lots.
That was not done here. Approval came
after the workshop had been erected. Secondly andjmore seriously, the restrictive covenant does not purport to give the architectural committee authority to relieve any lot
owner of a duty to comply. There is no
language in the covenant that could be construed to give such sweeping authority to the
committee. Instead, the covenant grants to

the committee the authority to examine
building plans, specifications, and plot plans
in order to determine "conformity and harmony of external design with existing structures" and location of the proposed building
with respect to topography and finished
ground elevation. The architectural committee can perform those duties without violating the covenants with regard to the four
types of buildings allowed.
IV. TERMINATION OF
THE COVENANTS
[21] 1133 Erickson contends that even if
the committee's approval of his structure is
invalid, the lot owners effectively terminated
the covenants. Erickson circulated a petition
that thirty-eight of the fifty-two homeowners
signed, giving their approval of the termination of the covenants. Article XIV of the
covenants provides:
These covenants are to run with the land
and shall be binding on all parties claiming
under them until January 1, 1994, at which
time said covenants shall be automatically
extended for successive periods of 10 years
unless by vote of a majority of the then
owners of the building sites covered by
these covenants it is agreed to change said
mts in whole or part,
rickson argues that the petition conthe owners' majority vote to termicovenants. However, looking at the
plain language of the article, the covenants
are to be "automatically extended . . . unless
by vote of a 77iajority of the then owners."
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the owners
have the power to amend the covenants, but
only at such time as the covenants are due
for extension. The last such time was January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such
time will be on January 1, 2004. This being
so, the petition, assuming it represents a
majority vote of the owners, is still invalid.
The owners' attempted termination of the
restrictive covenants is without effect.

§

V. ATTORNEY FEES
1135 There is no provision in the covenants
for an award of attorney fees to any owner
who successfully seeks enforcement of the
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covenants. The Swensons contend, however,
that they are entitled to attorney fees under
our wrongful lien statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-9-7 (1997). They assert that the notice
of termination of the restrictive covenants
recorded by Robert Campbell in the office of
the recorder of Salt Lake County constitutes
a wrongful lien within the meaning of our
statute. We disagree. Under section 38-91(6), a wrongful lien is defined as "any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real
property." The notice of termination did not
purport to place a lien or encumbrance on
the Swensons' property. Their claim for attorney fees is without merit.

S.H. Atherton, J., of aggravated assault.
Defendant appealed. Defendant filed motion
for summary reversal upon discovery that
videotape of second day of trial had been lost
and that transcript consequently could not be
prepared. The Court of Appeals denied motion and remanded for trial court to prepare
statement of evidence or proceedings. Defendant sought writ of certiorari. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that new trial, not
attempt to reconstruct record, was appropriate remedy in case in wrhich half of record
had been lost and main issue was sufficiency
of evidence to support conviction.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.

CONCLUSION
1136 The order of the trial court dissolving
the preliminary injunction against Erickson
and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against
him is reversed. The case is remanded to
the trial court to enter a permanent injunction against Erickson and for any further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
1137 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM,
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice
RUSSON concur in Chief Justice HOWE's
opinion.
1i 38 Justice STEWART concurs in the
result.

Criminal Law G=>1088.20
New trial, not attempt to reconstruct
record through statement of evidence or proceedings, was appropriate remedy for loss of
videotape that made it impossible to prepare
transcript for second day of two-day trial,
where one half of trial record had been lost
and main issue on appeal was sufficiency of
evidence to support conviction.

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt
Lake City, for defendant.
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2000 UT 38
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Joseph P. TUNZI, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 20000022.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 14, 2000.

Defendant wa.s convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Judith

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
DURHAM Justice:
111 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of
certiorari, seeks review of an order of remand issued by the court of appeals directing
the trial court to prepare and approve a
"statement of the evidence or proceedings"
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g). We grant petitioner's writ of
certiorari, reverse the court of appeals, and
remand the case to the trial court for a new
trial.

EXHIBIT "C

NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

GARY W . O T T
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UT*
D6VE ERICKSDN
9150 NOCBINGBIRD CK
SftKDY OF BW94
Br: ZJIt DEPUTY - WI I F .

Notice is hereby given that the Restrictive Covenants t'oi Quail Point Subdivision
lecorded on July 9. 1 973 in the office of the Satl Lake County Recorder as Entry No 2 5 5 3 0 8 8 .
Book 3368 Pages 429-432 were tciminated on lamiary I 2004 by a vote of a majority of the
owncis o f t h t building sites covered bv the Covenants The vote was 42 lor termination and 3

Wga,nsi
j->;r
This Notice and the resulting termination relates to the following described ica] propeity
i < \ situated ni Salt Lake County State of Utah
Lots 1-52 Quad Point Subdnision a subdivision of Sail Lake County, Stale of Utah
according to the official plat thereof on file and of rata d in (he office of the Sail Lake
Covnly Re cor dei
OF'IITAK

DATED this 2&

rY OF SALT L A K ^ I

»d

before

me

~

da> of March. 2004

A

^

istrumem who duly acknowl»dg« to rm
s) ai rha fofecjoing inst
ibey execut&d th&^Bm

„—^^gg^^ud

CM

*\*-S.

Mionae) L Pope

Charles L Rhodes

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

OP
On die ^ ( day of Maich 2004 personally apDeaied befoie me Mic-haett, Pope and
Charles L Rhodes who being first duly sworn did say lh«.u they arc property owners in the Quai
Point Subdivision and on January I 2004 they supervised the vote of properly owners of the
Qudil Potnl Subdivision regaiding the termindiion of icsliicir\ e covenants relating lo that
subdivision and that the facts set foith in this Notice of Termination are ti ue and correct

(JmL tfpuy-*
Notary Public)Signature
NOTARY PUBLIC
CINDY HEINER
8S50Sou«h 1300E3SI

y

M
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Third Judicial District

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

OCT 2 5 2H04
SA1TI A

DAVID and BARBRA SWENSON,
ORDER

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 040902545

vs.

JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

DAVID ERICKSON, and DAVID
LIMBERG,
Defendants•

Oral arguments on plaintiffs

' Mocion To Nullify

Termination

Restrictive Covenants were heard on September 20, 2004.
conclusion

of

advisement.

the

hearing,

the

Court

took

the

of

At the

matter

under

Now, having considered the parties' arguments along

with the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated
herein and denies plaintiffs' motion.
This

action

revolves

around

the

Quail

Point

Subdivision

Restrictive Covenants, originally filed with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on July 9, 1973

In 1997, Quail Point lot owner David

Srickson commenced construction of a storage shed on his property,
[n response, Quail Point

lot owners David and Barbara

Swenson

["plaintiffs") brought an action in Third District Court to e n ] o m
Ir. Enckson's construction as a violation of Article I of the
ubdivision's restrictive covenants.x

!

Under Article I of the restrictive covenants, no structure
hall be. "erected, placed or altered on any premises in [Quail
o m t ] until the building plans, specifications, and plot plans
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After an injunction was entered, Mr. Erickson attempted to
terminate the covenants by filing a Notice of Termination based
upon a vote of lot owners.

The Third District Court dismissed the

case and plaintiffs' appealed

In a written decision, the Utah

Supreme Court: concluded that Mr

Erickson's attempt to terminate

the covenants was ineffective and remanded the case to the District
Court for entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting Erickson from
building the shed on his Quail Point lot.
UT 16,

Swenson v Erickson 2000

998 P.2d 807.

On January 1, 2 0 04

Quail Point subdivision lot owners again

voted to terminate the restrictive covenants.

A majority voted to

terminate the covenants and a Notice of Termination was recorded
with Salt Lake County on March 26, 2 0 04.

In response to the Notice

of Termination, plaintiffs now bring this Motion To Nullify against
David Erickson and David Limberg
termination on two main grounds
"termination"

by

majority

[lj

vote,

("defendants"), challenging the
tne covenants do not allow for
and

(2)

automatically renewed for a successive ten

the

covenants

were

(10) year period on

January l, 2 004.
As an initial matter, the Court rejects plaintiffs contention

showing the location of such building have been approved as to
conformity and harmony of external design with existing
structures in the development, and as to location of the building
with respect to topography and finished ground elevation by an
architectural committee
"
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that the termination was ineffective because the covenants only
allow for a "change" and not a "termination" by majority vote.
Article XIV of the restrictive covenants states in relevant part,
"[t]hese covenants are to run with the land
and shall be binding on all parties and all
persons claiming under them until January 1,
1994 at which time said covenants shall be
automatically extended for successive periods
of 10 years unless by a vote of a majority of
the then owners of the building sites
covered by these covenants it is agreed to
change said covenants in whole or
part."
(Emphasis added).
This Court concludes thau the phrase "in whole or part" allows
termination of the covenants, as a whole, by majority vote.

for
Such

conclusion, is consistent with the plain language of the covenants.
Next, the Swensons ' argue thau the termination vote
have

occurred

prior

to

January

1,

2004.

should

Specifically,

the

Swensons' contend thai: the automatic renewal period engaged on
January 1st, 2 0 04 and that any amendments to, or termination of, the
:ovenants is not available for another ten years.

In Swenson at

U 34 the Utah Supreme Court states ."[t]he owners have the power to amend the
covenants, but only at such time as the covenants
are due for extension. The last such time was
January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time
will be on January
1, 2004."
(Emphasis added).
he phrase

"on January 1, 2 004" indicates that the Utah

Court

reviously determined that a vote conducted and tallied on that
ite was valid.

Accordingly,

the January

rfective and the covenants were terminated.

1, 2004 ruling

was
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Plaintiff's Motion is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT:

ORDER

EXHIBIT "E"

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

FEB 0 2 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

David Swenson and Barbara
Swenson,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 20041041-CA
F I L E D
[February 2, 2006)

v.
David V. Erickson and David R.
Limberg,

2006 UT App 34

Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 040902545
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
Attorneys:

Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
J. Thomas Bowen, Midvale, for Appellees

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh.
McHUGH, Judge:
%1
David and Barbara Swenson appeal the trial court's dismissal
with prejudice of their complaint against David V. Erickson and
David R. Limberg (collectively, Defendants). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2
The Swensons, Erickson, and Limberg are owners of abutting
lots in the Quail Point Subdivision (the Subdivision) in Sandy,
Utah. A real estate development company created the Quail Point
Subdivision in July 1973, at which time that company recorded the
Quail Point Subdivision Restrictive Covenants (the Covenants).
%2
In 1997, Erickson began building a structure he intended to
use as a workshop and storage facility on his lot in the
Subdivision. The Swensons filed suit against Erickson, alleging
that Erickson's structure violated the Covenants. As a result,
the Swensons obtained an injunction prohibiting Erickson from
building his structure. After the injunction issued, a majority
of the Subdivision lot owners voted to terminate the Covenants,

and a notice of termination of the Covenants was filed with the
Salt Lake County Recorder. Erickson then filed a motion to
dismiss the Swensons' complaint against him and to remove the
injunction prohibiting him from building his structure. In
response, the Swensons filed a motion to nullify the notice of
termination of the Covenants. The trial court granted Erickson's
motion, dismissing the Swensons' complaint and setting aside the
injunction. The Swensons appealed. In Swenson v. Erickson, 2000
UT 16, 998 P.2d 807 (Swenson I), the Utah Supreme Court held that
the Covenants prohibited Erickson's structure. See id. at fl9.
The Swenson I court also held that the Subdivision lot owners'
attempted termination of the Covenants was invalid because it was
undertaken prior to the expiration of the ten-year period
specified by the plain language of the Covenants. See id. at
1f33-34. The Swenson I court remanded the case, see id. at f36,
and thereafter, the trial court issued a permanent injunction
that prohibited Erickson from keeping the structure on his lot.
^4
On January 1, 2 0 04, at the end of the ten-year period
specified in the Covenants, another vote was conducted from 12:00
p.m. to 2:00 p.m., and a majority of the Subdivision lot owners
voted to terminate the Covenants. On March 26, 2 0 04, a notice of
termination of the Covenants was filed with the Salt Lake County
Recorder. The Swensons filed suit against Defendants seeking an
order declaring that the March 26, 2004 notice of termination was
void and requiring it to be removed, an order declaring that the
Covenants were still valid and in effect, an order declaring that
the permanent injunction previously issued by the trial court was
still valid and in effect, an injunction prohibiting Defendants
from erecting any structures on any Subdivision lots in violation
of the Covenants, and costs and attorney fees. Thereafter, the
Swensons filed a motion to nullify the March 26, 2004 notice of
termination. The court heard oral argument on the motion and
took the matter under advisement.
15
In its October 25, 2004 written decision denying the
Swensons' motion, the trial court ruled that the portion of the
Covenants that allowed for changes to be made to them "in whole
or part" included the power to terminate the Covenants. The
trial court also concluded, based upon language contained in
Swenson I, see id. at f34, that the vote conducted on January 1,
2004, was effective to terminate the Covenants. After issuing
its decision, the trial court dismissed the Swensons' complaint
against Defendants with prejudice. The Swensons appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
K6
The Swensons argue that Defendants' termination of the
Covenants was invalid because the Covenants do not allow for
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termination, but instead allow only for changes to be made to
them "in whole or part." Alternatively, the Swensons argue that
even if the terms of the Covenants allow for termination, the
Defendants' termination was neither completed prior to the
automatic renewal of the Covenants for a ten-year period, nor in
accordance with the Utah Supreme Courtfs holding in Swenson I.
See id. "The trial court's interpretation of the language of a
restrictive covenant, absent resort to extrinsic evidence,
presents a question of law which we review for correctness." Id.
at fl2. Further, "[w]hether a trial court correctly interpreted
a prior judicial opinion is a question of law that we review for
correctness." Jensen v. IHC Hosps. , Inc., 2003 UT 51,1(56, 82
P.3d 1076.
ANALYSIS
i|7

In relevant part, the Covenants provide:
These covenants are to run with the land and
shall be binding on all parties and all
persons claiming under them until January 1,
1994, at which time said covenants shall be
automatically extended for successive periods
of 10 years unless by vote of a majority of
the then owners of the building sites covered
by these covenants it is agreed to change
said covenants in whole or part.

f8
Based upon this language, the Swensons argue that the
termination of the Covenants was invalid because the Covenants do
not allow for termination, but instead allow only for changes to
be made to them "in whole or part." We disagree. Instead, we
agree with the trial court that the portion of the Covenants
allowing for changes to them "in whole" includes the power to
terminate or extinguish them. See, e.g., French v. Diamond HillJarvis Civic League, 724 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App. 1987)
(addressing "the appellees' contention that there [was] no right
to abolish the restrictions as opposed to merely amending them,"
stating that " [i]t has been held that the right to amend
[restrictive covenants] includes the right to change them so as
to remove [them] , " and holding that "the majority of the owners
had the right to amend the restrictions even to the point of
destroying or removing them"); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62,^14, 987 P.2d 30
("Restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of
property." (quotations and citations omitted)).
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1J9
As an alternative argument, the Swensons contend that even
if the Covenants allow for termination, the termination was not
completed until after the Covenants had already been extended for
a ten-year period, which the Swensons assert commenced at 12:01
a.m. on January 1, 2004. In contrast, Defendants argue that on
January 1, 2004, the majority of the then owners of the
Subdivision lots voted to release the Covenants and that this
vote was effective to terminate them.
flO Restrictive covenants are contracts that should be enforced
consistently with the intention of the parties.
Restrictive covenants that run with the land
and encumber subdivision lots form a contract
between subdivision property owners as a
whole and individual lot owners; therefore,
interpretation of the covenants is governed
by the same rules of construction as those
used to interpret contracts. Generally,
unambiguous restrictive covenants should be
enforced as written. However, where
restrictive covenants are susceptible to two
or more reasonable interpretations, the
intention of the parties is controlling. The
intention of the parties is ascertained from
the document itself and the language used
within the document.
Swenson I, 2000 UT 16,fll, 998 P.2d 807 (citations omitted).
fll Thus, as with the interpretation of contracts generally, we
"first look[] to the contract's four corners to determine the
parties1 intentions, which are controlling." Fairbourn
Commercial, Inc. v. American Hous. Partners, Inc., 2 004 UT
54,fl0, 94 P.3d 292 (quotations and citations omitted). If that
language is unambiguous, we will determine "the parties'
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as
a matter of law." Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see
also Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977, 980-81 (1922)
("[0]ur decision of this case is based entirely upon what we
conceive to be the obvious intention of the parties at the time
they executed the contract. We have endeavored to determine that
intention from the plain, unambiguous terms of the contract
considered in the light of what the parties must have foreseen
and contemplated at the time the contract was executed. . . .
[W]e deem it our duty to give effect to that intention without
regard to technical rules, the too rigid application of which
oftentimes defeats the very purpose for which they were
intended."); Cummincrs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 621-22
(1912) (stating that courts must give "the language found in [an]
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agreement its ordinary and usual meaning when applied to the
subject-matter and nature of the agreement and apparent object or
purpose of the parties" and that " [cjourts will always incline
towards giving language a reasonable construction, and will
avoid, if possible, an absurdity if the language is susceptible
of some other meaning"); Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 P. 460, 463
(1909) ("The only thing . . . that the courts are concerned with
is to ascertain the intention of the parties to any contract,
and, when this is ascertained, the duty to enforce such intention
admits of no escape, A primary canon of construction is to
construe the language of the parties when applied to the subjectmatter of the contract. The language used when applied to the
subject-matter must be given its usual and ordinary meaning,
unless it is clear that certain words or terms are employed in a
technical sense.").
^12 In Swenson I, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the same
language at issue here, stating:
Erickson argues that the petition constitutes
the owners' majority vote to terminate the
[C]ovenants. However, looking at the plain
language of the article, the [C]ovenants are
to be "automatically extended . . . unless by
vote of a majority of the then owners."
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the owners have
the power to amend the [C]ovenants, but only
at such time as the [C]ovenants are due for
extension. The last such time was January 1,
1994; we assume that the next such time will
be on January 1, 2 004.
Swenson I, 2000 UT 16 at ^[34 (third alteration in original)
(quoting the Covenants).
1JX3 Although the Swensons maintain that the Covenants were
automatically extended at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004, neither
the Covenants nor the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Swenson I
supports such a conclusion. The Covenants state that they will
be automatically extended every ten years unless a majority of
the then owners of the Subdivision lots votes to amend them in
whole or in part. The Utah Supreme Court held that the intent of
the parties was that changes to the Covenants could only be made
at the conclusion of those ten-year periods, noting that the next
opportunity to do so would be January 1, 2004. See id.
%14 There is nothing in the document indicating that the parties
to the original contract intended to have the 12:01 a.m. deadline
suggested by the Swensons, and the Utah Supreme Court did not so
hold. Rather, the express language supports an intent for the
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Covenants to run "until January 1, [2004], at which time" the
automatic extension of them could be defeated by a majority vote
of the then owners of the Subdivision lots. The inclusion of
only a date without a specific time suggests that the vote could
be taken any time that day. If the parties had intended to
impose a strict 12:01 a.m. deadline, as suggested by the
Swensons, the Covenants could have said so. See Dansie v. HiCountry Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62,fl4, 987 P.2d 30.
1|l5 The record indicates that the vote in this case took place
sometime between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2 004.
Because the vote took place on the date identified by the terms
of the Covenants, we conclude that it was effective to change,
even to the point of terminating, the Covenants.
CONCLUSION
fl6 We conclude that the portion of the Covenants allowing for
changes to be made to them "in whole" includes the power to
terminate or extinguish them. We also conclude that the vote
that took place on January 1, 2004, was conducted in accordance
with the terms of the Covenants and the Utah Supreme Court's
holding in Swenson I, and was effective to terminate the
Covenants. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice of the Swensons' complaint against Defendants.

A ^ 7 6 Jrt'&A
LrolynC^.

\ll

McHugh,Juage/^

WE CONCUR:
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